The Supreme Court has ruled that the voting process should be on party lines and the individuality of a member of parliament should include the party position. To think otherwise is to sound the “death knell” of our system of parliamentary democracy.
This was contained in the detailed order issued by the Supreme Court on the interpretation of Article 63-A of the Constitution.
The 95-page majority judgment was penned by Justice Muneeb Akhtar and discussed a number of topics including the penalty for defection, counting of votes versus voting and even the conscientious objector.
“Vote casting is, and should be, across party lines,” the ruling said, adding, “In that sense, the individuality of the member must be factored into the party position.”
“To stop otherwise is to sound the death knell of our system of parliamentary democracy.”
It further states that no party-based government can carry out its legislative or executive agenda if for every vote in a House/Assembly it is permanently required by its MPs. Had to run back.
The judgment said that this would also reduce the stature of any opposition.
“However the votes may be counted, the casting of them is a different matter. No one can be misled or deceived by the former into a misapprehension of the Constitution as to the latter.”
Disqualification For Life.
The Court noted that it was at least arguable that a deviant person could fall within the purview of Article 62(1)(f).
The question is, if so, what should be the punishment, i.e. period of disqualification? As noted above, if a member who casts a prohibited vote is deseated, he or she may run for re-election in a by-election.
If he chooses to contest it, he can do so as an “independent” or on the ticket of those who sought, engineered, welcomed, brought about and/or Awarded. If he loses, the resulting humiliation is also a form of punishment, for the deviant and his puppets.
However, the cyclical nature of the electoral process must also be taken into account.
“Imposition of ban for life means removal of the defector for all subsequent cycles. As Article 63(1)(p) confers the necessary power on Parliament, we are of the view that in para 4 Having said that, it is better to leave the matter to the Legislature.
Annotate, Read or Rewrite?
If the speed of decisions is valid constitutional law, then where does interpretation end and reading begin?
And as this momentum continues, when or where is interpretation or reading rewriting in the shadows? or that certain constitutional provisions are so broad that they can be given essentially any meaning or interpretation or reading, which can be molded and embedded in the fabric of constitutional law, and any reading of them Or does it not work again?
If so, why should this be true only for some provisions and not for others, especially if they are linked to a fundamental right, as Article 9 is such a right?
We note only that deterministic constitutional theory leads to conclusions and paths that go far beyond mere interpretation (at least as commonly understood) and deep into what some call “forbidden territory.” “, i.e. read and/or rewrite swamps.
Conscientious Objector
One point strongly pressed upon the court was the position of the conscientious objector. It was contended that the right to dissent and dissent from the party position, and the right to publicly record and register such dissent and dissent by casting a prohibited vote, cannot be affected in any way, as If so, his vote should be ignored. Although it was not stated in so many words, it meant that a conscientious objector had the right to be martyred for his cause and if he willingly and deliberately (as in) his own stomach. He chooses to wave himself along. And be declared a deviant and de-settled, so be it.
This right trumps all other considerations. With respect, we are unable to agree.
The first point to note is just that. Although the hearings were spread over several dates, not a single example – not one – was ever given of an actual, real-life conscientious objector who resorted to deviation and de-settlement under Article 63A. This article has now been part of the Constitution for a quarter of a century, which must include the decade before it (from 1985, when s. 8-B was inserted in the 1962 Act, to 1997). Not a single conscientious objector. And at the same time it has never been denied by the learned counsel appearing before the court or any member of the bench that the risk of defection was present throughout the period and till now, and is very high. Living and hurting the body politic.
The closest example that came up was that of a lawyer who is also a senator. He was supposed to vote for a constitutional amendment many years ago that his party wanted but to which he strongly, indeed passionately, objected. On an inquiry by the court, the senator said that he finally did not have the courage of his convictions and cast his vote as required by the party. Not an example.
Therefore, bearing in mind our constitutional and political history, it can be said with some confidence and with all due respect that the “problem” of the conscientious objector is essentially an artificial construct.
